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Abstract
Traffic analysis attacks to identify which web page a
client is browsing, using only her packet metadata —
known as website fingerprinting — has been proven ef-
fective in closed-world experiments against privacy tech-
nologies like Tor. However, due to the base rate fal-
lacy, these attacks have failed in large open-world set-
tings against clients that visit sensitive pages with a low
base rate. We find that this is because they have poor
precision as they were designed to maximize recall.
In this work, we argue that precision is more impor-
tant than recall for open-world website fingerprinting.
For this reason, we develop three classes of precision
optimizers, based on confidence, distance, and ensemble
learning, that can be applied to any classifier to increase
precision. We test them on known website fingerprinting
attacks and show significant improvements in precision.
Against a difficult scenario, where the attacker wants to
monitor and distinguish 100 sensitive pages each with a
low mean base rate of 0.00001, our best optimized clas-
sifier can achieve a precision of 0.78; the highest preci-
sion of any known attack before optimization was 0.014.
We use precise classifiers to tackle realistic objectives
in website fingerprinting, including selection, identifica-
tion, and defeating website fingerprinting defenses.
1 Introduction
The massive scale of state-level surveillance was af-
firmed in 2013 by the Snowden revelations. Yet, it has
continued to expand. Recent events show that state actors
continue to take an interest in large-scale persistent and
passive monitoring of the Internet. In November 2016,
the UK passed the Investigatory Powers Act, described
by the executive director of the Open Rights Group as
“unprecedented powers to monitor and analyze UK cit-
izens’ communications regardless of whether [they] are
suspected of any criminal activity.” [17] A similar growth
in surveillance can be seen in many countries.
Individuals seeking privacy in web browsing may need
to use privacy enhancing technologies such as VPNs and
anonymity networks like Tor. These technologies en-
crypt and redirect the user’s traffic across proxies, hid-
ing sender, recipient, and packet contents from a passive
observer. However, they fail to hide significant features
of user traffic, such as packet frequency, timing, order,
and direction. Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks
use these features to identify the client’s destination web
page, compromising her privacy. WF attacks only use
metadata, which can be monitored and recorded freely in
many countries as they are not considered to be personal,
legally [14].
The WF attacker wishes to monitor a set of sensitive
web pages and identify when a client visits these pages.
In the closed-world scenario, the classifier is tested only
on the same sensitive web pages that it is trained on. In
the harder open-world scenario, the classifier must also
correctly identify which pages it has never seen before
and are therefore not sensitive.
WF attacks have been proven effective against real-
world privacy technologies in the closed-world sce-
nario [3, 10, 15, 21, 28]. However, there is a general aca-
demic consensus that WF fails in the open world due to
the base rate fallacy. In 2016, Panchenko et al. studied
WF attacks in a large open world and concluded that “no
existing [WF] method scales when applied in realistic
settings [in the open world]” [21]. This paper tackles the
unsolved problem of open-world website fingerprint-
ing (OWF). The open-world scenario has been challeng-
ing for other fields that rely on machine learning as well,
including forensic analysis [24], intrusion detection sys-
tems [23], and medical imaging [26]. Open-world failure
in forensic analysis has been subject to public contro-
versy [19] as it leads to wrongful convictions.
We argue that the reason why WF fails in the open
world is because previous work has focused on the wrong
metric. All known WF attacks attempt to maximize re-
call (true positive rate), as is standard in closed-world
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Table 1: How we count the number of true positives (NT P), wrong positives (NWP), and false positives (NFP). After
counting them, we obtain the true positive rate RT P = NT P/NP, wrong positive rate RWP = NWP/NP, and false positive
rate RFP = NFP/NN .
Classified as
Correct sensitive
class
Wrong sensitive
class Non-sensitive class
Tr
ue
cl
as
s Sensitive class
(# = NP)
True Positive
(# = NT P)
Wrong Positive
(# = NWP)
False Negative
(# = NP−NT P−NWP)
Non-sensitive class
(# = NN) Not possible
False Positive
(# = NFP)
True Negative
(# = NN−NFP)
evaluation. However, a successful open-world classifier
must have high precision to avoid the base rate fallacy.
As this argument is central to our work, we expound our
point in Section 2. A known method to adapt closed-
world classifiers for OWF is to add a new class that rep-
resents the open world, but we will show that this method
is often both inaccurate and imprecise.
This work contributes three classes of techniques that
can improve the open-world precision of any closed-
world classifier; we call them Precision Optimizers
(POs). We demonstrate the effectiveness of our POs by
significantly improving the precision of six known WF
attacks. We will find that even relatively simple POs
can significantly improve the precision of WF attacks,
demonstrating incorrect optimization in WF attacks. We
present these results in Section 3; our best PO can im-
prove a classifier’s precision from 0.014 to 0.78 in a sce-
nario with a very low base rate.
We show that our improved classifiers are better able
to handle realistic scenarios — and thus pose a greater
threat to privacy — in Section 4. In particular, we use
them to attack several WF defenses in Section 4.3, and
show that we can significantly improve precision against
defenses as well. We discuss several pertinent WF issues
in Section 5, give a survey of related work in Section 6,
and conclude in Section 7.
2 Background
2.1 Terminology and Setting
A classifier takes as input a testing element and deter-
mines which class it belongs to. In our case, the test-
ing element is a sequence of packets (with timing, size
and direction) and each class is a web page.1 When the
classifier claims that the tested packet sequence is sensi-
tive, it is known as a positive; it is a true positive (TP) if
the tested packet sequence came from the same page the
classifier identified, and it is a false positive (FP) if the
tested packet sequence came from a non-sensitive page.
We define a wrong positive (WP) to be a sensitive page
1In this work, we use sequences of Tor cells where each cell has the
same size; we still call them packet sequences for generality.
mistaken as another sensitive page. While some previ-
ous works have considered a wrong positive to be a false
positive, we do not, because the tested packet sequence
did not come from a non-sensitive page. Refer to Ta-
ble 1 for an illustration of these terms and how their rates
(TPR/WPR/FPR) are defined. We also refer to TPR as
recall; previous WF works used recall as the main metric
to compare and optimize WF attacks.
Our WF attacker is a passive eavesdropper that is lo-
cal to the client. The attacker watches packet sequences
sent by the client, and knows the client’s identity. The
privacy-sensitive client uses encryption with proxies to
hide her packet contents and destination web page from
the attacker. The attacker compromises her privacy by
using a classifier that decides if the client is visiting a set
of sensitive pages. The classifier is trained on supervised
packet sequence data, which he collected by visiting the
sensitive pages himself. The set of sensitive pages is, in-
evitably, a small subset of all web pages, so the attacker
must be able to recognize when the client is not visiting
sensitive web pages, avoiding the base rate fallacy.
The base rate fallacy describes the following problem:
if the FPR is higher than the base rate of positive events
(sensitive web page accesses), then the positive classifi-
cations of the classifier are mostly false, even if recall is
100%. In this case, a classifier with a high recall may
still be useless in practice, as most of its positive clas-
sifications are false. To illustrate this with an example,
consider a boy who always cries wolf when he spots a
wolf (100% recall), but has a 20% chance of crying wolf
every day when he does not spot a wolf (20% FPR), out
of boredom. If a wolf appears once every 46 days, only
10% of the boy’s cries are correct (10% precision), and
the villagers may ignore him despite his perfect recall.
The base rate fallacy is the chief challenge of OWF.
To avoid the base rate fallacy, the attacker wants to clas-
sify a page access as sensitive only if he is confident that
the classification is correct. In this work, we propose and
evaluate three classes of techniques to improve OWF pre-
cision, which we call precision optimizers (POs).
2
In this work, we also consider WF defenses. These
defenses have been proposed to defend web-browsing
clients against WF attacks. WF defenses are applied by
the client and her proxies, and they transform the packet
sequence to disrupt the attacker’s ability to classify them
correctly. We will evaluate the effectiveness of these de-
fenses in the open world with our optimized classifiers.
We present our notations in Table 2.
2.2 r-precision
The base rate fallacy shows that the TPR of WF classi-
fiers does not tell the whole story. We must also con-
sider the WPR and FPR as well. A classifier should only
be considered effective if its positive classifications are
largely true; otherwise, the attacker cannot act on its pos-
itive classifications. None of the above metrics, alone,
tell us if the classifier satisfies this criteria. We also need
to include a fourth metric: the base rate at which the
client accesses sensitive web pages. Without considering
the base rate, it is not clear how any attack fares against
the base rate fallacy.
We propose the use of r-precision to measure WF at-
tacks, which considers all of the four metrics above. We
derive it in the following. The number of positive classi-
fications returned by the classifier is the sum of the num-
bers of true, wrong, and false positives (NT P +NWP +
NFP). Among its positive classifications, the ratio of true
positive classifications is equal to:
pi =
NT P
NT P+NWP+NFP
This is the precision of the classifier. In an experimental
setting, we measure rates (T PR, WPR, FPR) rather than
direct counts, which requires an explicit definition of the
base rate.
pir =
RT P ·NP
RT P ·NP+RWP ·NP+RFP ·NN
=
RT P
RT P+RWP+
NN
NP
·RFP
Setting r = NN/NP, we arrive at our formulation of r-
precision that incorporates the base rate.2 r-precision is
the analytical basis used in the remainder of this paper.
r (which we call the base ratio) is the relative likelihood
of negative events (client visiting any non-sensitive page)
to positive events (client visiting any sensitive page). A
higher r reduces r-precision holding all other rates con-
stant, making the classification problem harder.
Our objective is to maximize pir for WF attacks. In our
experiments, we present results for r = 10 and r = 1000,
representing respectively an easy and hard classification
setting. Note that r describes the total base ratio of all
2The base rate is in fact NPNN+NP =
1
1+r .
Table 2: Notation used in this paper.
NP, NN # of positives, negatives
NT P, NWP, NFP # of true, wrong, false positives
RT P, RWP, RFP True, wrong, false positive rates
r Base ratio, equal to NN /NP
pir precision for base ratio r
PO Method to improve WF precision
Recall Equal to RT P
P A packet sequence
C A class
sensitive pages (we consider 100 sensitive pages in our
work). For example, if the attacker wants to monitor 100
sensitive pages and the client has a 1/100,000 chance
of visiting each sensitive page, the attacker’s precision
would be correctly captured by our pi1000 scenario.
r-precision is more intuitive for the open world than
TPR, WPR and FPR. r-precision is equal to the prob-
ability that the WF classifier is correct when it says
that the client has visited a sensitive page, if the client
visits r times as many non-sensitive pages as sensitive
pages. Another advantage to using r-precision is that
it directly considers the base rate. In several previous
works [21, 22], researchers noted that the performance
of their WF classifiers dropped when they considered a
larger open world, which led them to conclude that OWF
was not realistic. This is an incomplete conclusion be-
cause they also indirectly increased r when expanding
the open world. We will observe that r-precision does
not decrease with larger open world sizes (in fact, it in-
creases to a point because the classifier is trained on more
information), so we have avoided this issue.
The minimum recall we accept in this work is 0.2.
Our approach to OWF is novel compared to previous
work; we maximize r-precision while ensuring the re-
call is acceptable, while previous works maximize re-
call [3,21,22,27–29]. Our new approach avoids the base
rate fallacy and better fits the open-world attack model.
2.3 Does precision trump recall?
In the classical formulation of WF, the effectiveness of
an attack is measured with its recall (TPR). We present
three arguments to convince the reader that it is more
important to optimize the precision of WF attacks than
their recall.
Base rate fallacy. Section 2.1 shows that a WF classifier
can never be said to have avoided the base rate fallacy no
matter how high its recall is. There are billions of pages
on the Internet, and the base rate for the vast majority of
pages is low. Furthermore, pages change over time, and
dynamic content further distorts page information [12,
30]. Only if the attacker is confident that the classifier’s
positive classifications are true (precision is high) can the
3
attacker act on them. The base rate fallacy highlights the
epistemological deficiency of recall in the open world: it
does not tell us anything about open-world effectiveness.
Chilling effect. Web-browsing clients using anonymity
networks are sensitive to privacy and do not want the at-
tacker to capture any of their browsing behavior. When
WF precision is high, even a moderate recall may trouble
privacy-sensitive users. For example, a whistleblower
who would suffer a 10% recall — a 10% chance of re-
vealing each sensitive page access to any eavesdroppers
— may instead choose to self-censor or use a WF de-
fense (which are not yet implemented and may incur sig-
nificant overhead).
Repeated visits. Browsing patterns are often consistent
and self-repeating, and users visit the same websites fre-
quently. Repeatedly visiting the same page would allow
a low-recall, high-precision attacker to observe it. Even
with a low recall, the WF attacker would eventually be
able to determine if the client is interested in particular
sensitive pages. A high recall is unnecessary in such a
scenario. Repeated visits cause a gradual decay in online
privacy.
One way to improve open-world performance is to
minimize FPR, but this can be achieved trivially. For
any algorithm with TPR RT P, WPR RWP and FPR RFP,
it is possible to achieve TPR αRT P, WPR αRWP and FPR
αRFP for any 0≤ α ≤ 1 by simply randomly classifying
positive instances as negative instances with probability
α . This procedure, which produces the trivial diagonal
ROC curve, would have no effect on precision. Since we
want to increase the precision of classifiers in our work,
we must develop better techniques.
2.4 Experimental setup
We collected our data set for OWF between March and
June 2017 with Tor Browser 6.5.1 on Tor 0.2.9.10. We
focus exclusively on Tor because it is both popular and
relatively resilient. Furthermore, it is the most difficult
for WF out of currently usable anonymity networks [10],
WF attacks designed to succeed in the Tor scenario also
tend to succeed against other privacy technologies [27].
We collected a set of sensitive (monitored) pages and
non-sensitive (non-monitored) pages. We chose the top
133 pages on Alexa as the sensitive set, visiting each of
them 600 times, and the next 60,000 pages on Alexa as
the non-sensitive set, visiting each of them once. We de-
cided that the sensitive pages should be top sites to best
represent a practical client’s possible interests. We vis-
ited each site for one minute, collecting all cells. Af-
ter filtering away pages which frequently did not load,
we ended up with 100 pages (500 instances each) in the
sensitive set and 50,000 pages in the open-world set.3
3Most of the 33 pages that failed to load in the top pages were Chi-
nese, which usually cannot be accessed from Tor exit nodes.
For each web page, we collected the times, sizes, and
directions of all packets, from which Tor cells can be de-
rived [29], representing a local, passive attacker’s infor-
mation.
For convenience, we may describe a subset of our
full data set using numeric notation such as 50x100+20,
which denotes that the subset has 50 monitored pages,
100 instances of each page, and 20 non-monitored pages
(non-monitored pages always have one instance each).
In this work, we measure the 95% confidence interval
of a statistic xˆ by taking:
C(xˆ) = 1.96
√
xˆ(1− xˆ)
n
This is the confidence interval of the mean for the normal
distribution using the Wald method, and we apply it to
TPR, WPR, and FPR. We then write xˆ±C(xˆ) to show the
confidence interval of xˆ. We are able to use the normal
distribution as our n is large (usually 50,000). However,
the above does not apply to r-precision. Recall that the
definition of r-precision is:
pir =
RT P
RT P+RWP+ r ·RFP
Let us denote RmaxT P = RT P +C(RT P), and R
min
T P = RT P−
C(RT P), and correspondingly for RWP and RFP. We take
a naı¨ve 95% confidence interval by computing the maxi-
mum pir:
pimaxr =
RmaxT P
RminT P +R
min
WP+ r ·RminFP
We take C(pir) = pimaxr −pir and show the confidence in-
terval as pir±C(pir).4 When r is large (as in our experi-
ments), precision is often dominated by the r ·RminFP term
in the denominator.
When pir is high, C(pir), its confidence interval, is un-
stable. This is because a high r-precision indicates a
very small number of false positives, especially in the
r = 1000 scenario. For example, consider an experiment
with NP = 50000 and NN = 50000 where we find that
RT P = 0.36,RWP = 0,RFP = 0.00004. This gives pi1000 =
0.9. However, this means that NFP = RFP ·NN = 2< 10,
which fails the basic criteria for using the normal dis-
tribution as the confidence interval. In such cases, we
calculate the maximum FPR using the Wilson method
(which better suits the extremely small rate RFP), with
z = 1.96 for the 95% confidence interval:
RmaxFP =
RFP+ z
2
2NN
+ z
√
RFP(1−RFP)
NN
+ z
2
4N2N
1+ z
2
NN
4This C(pir) is larger than an alternative C′(pir) = pir−piminr , so the
estimation is cautious.
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Then, we take the minimum precision as
piminr =
RminT P
RmaxT P +R
max
WP + r ·RmaxFP
Finally, we express the precision with its lower bound of
pir ≥ piminr . We present no value for the upper bound of
precision as it cannot be accurately measured. Contin-
uing the above example, we find RminT P = 0.356, R
max
T P =
0.364, RmaxWP = 0, and R
max
FP = 0.00015, so we would write
pi1000 ≥ 0.70, not pi1000 = 0.9. We use the Wilson method
for pi1000 whenever NFP < 10.
2.5 WF attacks
We choose a subset of WF attacks to test our POs. All
chosen attacks were state-of-the-art at the time they were
published, and each attack achieved success in closed-
world website fingerprinting. We summarized the attacks
briefly in Table 3, in order of publication; we describe
these attacks in more detail in the Appendix.
In previous works, some of the above closed-world
classifiers were adapted for OWF simply by adding an
open-world class representing non-sensitive pages. As
we will see in Section 3.1, this technique achieves poor
results in practice. We need to come up with better tech-
niques to optimize precision.
3 Precision Optimizers
We modify closed-world classifiers to achieve high r-
precision for OWF using Precision Optimizers (POs).
Our POs teach the underlying classifier to be conserva-
tive, such that it would assign a packet sequence to the
negative class (non-sensitive web page) if it is not certain
about its classification. This reduces FPR, thus increas-
ing r-precision.
To optimize r-precision, we first ask the closed-world
classifier to classify the element as usual. If it is a neg-
ative classification, we do not apply PO. Otherwise, if
the classifier decides the element should be classified as
a sensitive page (we refer to that class as the assumed
class), we ask a PO whether or not we should reject clas-
sification of the assumed class. The PO may agree with
the assumed class, or it may reject the assumed class and
instead classify the element as non-sensitive. (Our POs
do not change a sensitive classification to another sensi-
tive classification.) This is shown in Figure 1.
Our POs are designed to be classifier-agnostic: they
treat the classifier as a black box and they can be applied
to all classifiers. Some POs are also parametrically tune-
able to allow maximization of r-precision.
We start this section by motivating our work with an
experiment on the baseline r-precision of WF classi-
fiers without any POs (Section 3.1). Then, we present
three types of POs: confidence-based POs (Section 3.2),
distance-based POs (Section 3.3), and ensemble POs
Figure 1: Flowchart describing how we classify an ele-
ment. Our Precision Optimizers (POs) modify classifi-
cation to improve precision as represented by the dotted
box.
(Section 3.4). Our techniques are inspired by techniques
used in clustering and ensemble learning.
3.1 Baseline precision
We first present the baseline precision as a compari-
son before applying any of our POs on the classifiers.
We experimented on the classifiers in Table 3, using the
experimental setup and methodology described in Sec-
tion 2.4. Besides the 100 classes each representing a sen-
sitive page, we add a 101st “non-monitored class” with
all 50,000 non-sensitive pages. We present the best re-
sults for 10-precision and 1000-precision in Table 4.
The above experiment shows that none of the algo-
rithms are precise in both scenarios. This demonstrates
that the trivial strategy of adding a non-sensitive class,
used in previous work, is unable to achieve high pre-
cision. The best-performing attacks are Ca-OSAD and
Ha-KFP, though roughly both of their positive classifi-
cations are almost half wrong in the easier pi10 scenario
(when one-tenth of the user’s page visits are sensitive to
the attacker).
All 100,000 packet sequences were part of the test-
ing set for each attack except Ca-OSAD.5 To form the
training set, we attempted to use 10-fold cross valida-
tion, so that the training set would have 100x450+45000
elements and the testing set would have 100x50+5000
elements, and we would repeat this ten times with ten
disparate testing sets. However, we found that this was
impossible for three attacks — Ha-KFP, Pa-SVM, and
Pa-CUMUL. For the first attack, we ran out of memory.
For the others, it was due to poor convergence proper-
ties of the underlying SVM classifier. For each of these
5We tested Ca-OSAD only on 100x50+5000 elements because of
the computational time involved to compute the custom SVM distance
kernel, which scales with the square of the number of instances. On the
full data set, it would’ve taken around 300,000 CPU hours.
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Table 3: Summary of the known WF attacks we will optimize for r-precision in this paper.
Name Classifier Classification mechanism
Bi-XCor [1] Scoring Cross correlation on inter-packet timing and lengths
Pa-SVM [22] SVM Sequence features such as length and packet ordering
Ca-OSAD [3] SVM Custom kernel using Levenshtein distance
Wa-kNN [28] kNN Custom-weighted kNN on various sequence features
Ha-kFP [9] Random Forest Random forest classifier on various sequence features
Pa-CUMUL [21] SVM Cumulative packet sizes
Table 4: Baseline 10-precision (pi10) and 1000-precision
(pi1000) for six known WF attacks without any PO.
Name pi10 pi1000
Bi-XCor [1] .059± .001 .00066± .00001
Pa-SVM [22] .249± .006 .0038± .0001
Ca-OSAD [3] .61± .04 .036± .014
Wa-kNN [28] .313± .005 .0048± .0001
Ha-kFP [9] .53± .01 .0137± .0006
Pa-CUMUL [21] .311± .007 .00499± .00016
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Figure 2: 10-precision for Wa-kNN and Pa-CUMUL
when trained on 100x50+N elements, where N is the size
of the open-world class.
cases, we reduced each training set from 90,000 elements
to 10,000 elements during 10-fold cross validation. (This
is approximately the same size or larger than the training
sets used in their works.)
In previous work, it has been shown that a larger
open world class size in the training set sometimes de-
creased classifier performance [21, 22]. This observa-
tion has been used to argue that WF attacks do not per-
form well in the open world [18]. We believe this is the
case only because the wrong metric was used. We mea-
sured pi10 for Wa-kNN and Pa-CUMUL on a testing set of
100x50+5000 elements and a training set of 100x50+N
elements, where we varied N (the open world class size)
from 100 to 5000. We plotted the results in Figure 2.
We see that increasing N in fact increases precision, as
may be expected of a competent classifier. The increase
is, however, somewhat uneven; this is partly due to the
inherently noisy nature of precision on a relatively small
testing set, but it also shows that adding an open world
class cannot achieve high precision consistently.
3.2 Confidence-based PO
To classify an input element P, some classifiers compute
some matching function match between P and all trained
classes C, and classify P to the class that maximizes the
value of the function:
argmax
C
match(P,C)
As an example, in the following we describe the match
function used by Support Vector Machines (SVMs).
SVMs are used by several WF attacks [3, 21, 22, 29]. We
specify the match function for other classifiers in the Ap-
pendix.
SVMs are binary classifiers: they seek to find an op-
timal separator between two classes in training. We de-
note fC,C′(P) ∈ {C,C′} as the classification output of an
SVM trained on two classes C and C′ when classify-
ing P. For multi-class classification, SVMs can use the
“one-against-one” classification system [4]. To decide
whether or not P belongs to C, the system computes a
score S(P,C):
S(P,C) =
∣∣{C′ 6=C| fC,C′(P) =C}∣∣
In other words, S(P,C) is the number of classes C′ such
that the SVM prefers C over C′ for classifying P. In the
end, the element is classified to the class with the highest
aggregate score. Therefore, S fits the definition of the
matching function for SVMs: S(P,C) = match(P,C).
The matching function of a classifier can be inter-
preted as its confidence. If match(P,C) is low for all
classes, the classifier is reluctant to classify P to any
class. Normally, the classifier will nevertheless choose
the highest-scoring class. This causes false positives
despite the classifier’s uncertainty. A confidence-based
PO would instead classify the element as negative if its
match is ambiguous (match(P,C) is too low for all C).
Our confidence-based PO works as follows. Suppose
that the classes are ordered from highest match to lowest,
such that C1 matches P the most (i.e. C1 is the assumed
class) , followed by C2, and so on, until CN+1. We first
scale all match values linearly so that match(P,C1) = 1
and match(P,CN+1) = 0. For parameters K and Mmatch,
we reject classification (classify the element as negative)
if ∑K+1i=2 match(P,Ci) > K ·Mmatch. In other words, we
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Table 5: Best 10-precision (pi10) and 1000-precision
(pi1000) with confidence-based PO.
Name pi10 pi1000
Bi-XCor [1] .93± .04 .13± .04
Pa-SVM [22] .306± .009 .0052± .0002
Ca-OSAD [3] .77± .08 ≥ .18
Wa-kNN [28] .91± .03 .11± .02
Ha-kFP [9] ≥ .97 ≥ .78
Pa-CUMUL [21] .43± .02 .0083± .0005
classify an element as negative if the top K competing
classes to the assumed class have a mean match score of
Mmatch or above. We vary K and Mmatch and test their
effects on r-precision.
The output of match is also useful in cases where the
attacker may want to rank his classifications, or explicitly
output the confidence of classification. We expand on
this use case in Section 4.1.
Which attacks apply?
All known attacks in the WF literature can be said to
compute a match(P,C) function for all C and choosing
the highest-scoring class to classify P. Therefore, the
confidence-based PO applies to all of our classifiers.
Results
We present the results of confidence-based PO with
regards to how it improves r-precision of our chosen WF
attacks in Table 5.
With confidence-based PO, we see that Ha-kFP be-
comes highly precise even under the difficult 1000-
precision scenario. In the optimal case (K = 2, Mmatch =
0.11), we observed RT P = 0.318 ± 0.004, RWP =
0.0014±0.0003, and RFP = 0 (there were no false posi-
tives), giving pi1000 ≥ 0.78 as shown in the table. In fact,
we found its mean precision to be much higher (0.996),
but we do not use this unstable value as explained in Sec-
tion 2.2.
The greatest improvement was observed in Bi-XCor,
where 10-precision saw a 15-fold increase and 1000-
precision saw a 200-fold increase. For Bi-XCor, we
originally measured a surprising false positive rate of
RFP = 0.89, but this was reduced to RFP = 0.0014 us-
ing our confidence-based PO. Bi-XCor without POs
was unable to deal with the open-world scenario, though
it was reasonably capable of handling the closed-world
scenario; our methods bridged the gap between the two.
On the other hand, the SVM-based classifiers Pa-SVM
and Pa-CUMUL did not gain a significant improvement
using confidence-based metrics. This may be because the
match function we chose for SVMs was not sufficiently
informative about classifier confidence.
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Figure 3: 10-precision with K = 3 and varying Mmatch
from 0.83 to 1.
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Figure 4: 10-precision with Mmatch = 0.9 and increasing
K from 1 to 20.
Optimal values for K and Mmatch differed for each al-
gorithm. For the best-performing algorithm, Ha-kFP,
the values were K = 2 and Mmatch = 0.11. It is interest-
ing to note that all attacks were most precise when K = 1
or K = 2, i.e. it is optimal to compare the confidence of
the assumed class only with the best competing class or
the best two competing classes, and not more. On the
other hand, the optimal value of Mmatch is a consequence
of the definition of match (detailed in the Abstract).
Ca-OSAD has a low lower bound in the pi1000 case
because, like Ha-kFP, we were able to find a sce-
nario in which there were no false positives; the TPR
was about 20%. However, for Ca-OSAD specifically,
due to computational restrictions, the number of non-
monitored pages tested was 10 times smaller (5,000 in-
stead of 50,000). This causes the precision to be unstable
as shown by the Wilson method.
In Figure 3, we show the effects of decreasing Mmatch
on the confidence-based PO when applied to Wa-kNN. A
lower Mmatch represents a more cautious PO: the PO will
reject the assumed class if the top K classes (besides the
assumed class) have a mean scaled match score above
Mmatch. Consequently, Mmatch = 1 disables the PO. Here,
we set K = 3, decrease Mmatch from 1 to 0.83, and show
the effects on 10-precision. (For Mmatch < 0.83, RT P <
0.2 and therefore we rejected these results.) We see a sig-
nificant improvement in 10-precision from 0.314±0.004
to 0.867±0.003 as we decrease Mmatch.
Similarly, in Figure 4, we increase K, the number
of competing classes, from 1 to 20 and evaluate 10-
precision. Here, we fix Mmatch = 0.9. An increased K de-
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Table 6: Best pi10 and pi1000 with the too-far PO and too-close PO on a 100x100+10000 data set.
Too-close PO Too-far PO
Name pi10 pi1000 Best distance pi10 pi1000 Best Distance
Bi-XCor [1] .54± .06 .016± .004 Bi-XCor .60± .04 .015± .002 Pa-SVM
Pa-SVM [22] .96± .08 ≥ .26 Bi-XCor .96± .07 ≥ .22 Bi-XCor
Ca-OSAD [3] .93± .09 ≥ .15 Bi-XCor .94± .06 .20± .18 Pa-CUMUL
Wa-kNN [28] .95± .07 ≥ .14 Bi-XCor .92± .07 .12± .10 Bi-XCor
Ha-kFP [9] .96± .08 ≥ .49 Bi-XCor .99± .03 ≥ .61 Pa-SVM
Pa-CUMUL [21] .97± .08 ≥ .18 Bi-XCor .96± .07 ≥ .16 Bi-XCor
creases 10-precision; and optimal 10-precision is found
at K = 1. This is expected as an increased K leads to a
lower average match and therefore the PO is less likely
to reject the assumed class. Although this does not im-
ply that optimal 10-precision will necessarily be found at
K = 1 as we vary both K and Mmatch, we did indeed find
the optimal 10-precision and 1000-precision of Wa-kNN
at K = 1 and Mmatch = 0.88.
3.3 Distance-based PO
Several WF attacks use or induce a notion of distance be-
tween packet sequences when performing classification.6
We found that those distances, when used to augment
the normal classification algorithm of WF attacks, could
serve to remove questionable positive classifications and
thus improve precision.
We derived distances between packet sequences based
on known attacks. For example, we defined a distance
based on Pa-SVM by executing its feature extraction
algorithm, and then applying the radial basis function
on the extracted features. From each distance between
packet sequences, we derive a distance between packet
sequences and classes. Note that while classifiers always
chose the class with the highest match score, they did not
choose the class with the shortest distance. For details
on how we derived distances from WF attacks, we refer
the reader to the Abstract. Then, we tested two different
distance-based POs:
1. Too-far PO: We trained the PO by computing ex-
pected in-class distance (distance between packet
sequences of the same class, for each class). If the
distance of a testing packet sequence to the assumed
class was more than Mdist f ar times the expected in-
class distance, we rejected classification.
2. Too-close PO: If there were at least Mdistclose
classes that were closer to the packet sequence than
its assumed class, we rejected classification.
6In our work, we do not use the strict mathematical definition of a
“metric” when referring to distances. In particular, many of our dis-
tances do not satisfy the triangle inequality in edge cases. Rather, the
distance quantifies the difference between packet sequences from the
classifier’s perspective. We avoid use of the word “metric” for this rea-
son, opting to use the word “distance”.
Which attacks apply?
We tested five distances, each one based on a different
attack; Ha-kFP did not produce a distance. All clas-
sifiers can be optimized with both distance-based POs,
even if it itself does not produce a distance. This means
that we have a total of 60 optimized classifiers (two types
of POs, five distances, six classifiers).
Results
We present the results for the two distance-based POs
in Table 6. For both data sets, it was impossible in
terms of both memory and computational time for us
to compute the distance between all elements in the full
100x500+50000 data set. Instead, we reduced the data
set to 100x100+10000 for both distance-based POs.
Interestingly, for the too-far PO, the best distance
to use was always the Bi-XCor distance (the cross-
correlation distance between packet timings and packet
sizes). This distance contained significant information
not sufficiently incorporated in future attacks, perhaps
because it had achieved a comparatively low TPR. Ap-
propriately, the distance for Bi-XCor could not save
itself from relatively poor precision; no other distance
could, either. This would suggest that Bi-XCor’s dis-
tance is useful, but its classifier is weak (in fact, it only
uses a naı¨ve comparison between distances to classify).
Poor results in the pi1000 scenario are due to the relatively
small experiment size (100x100+10000).
The optimal value for M was generally slightly less
than 1 for each of the above classifiers. A larger M weak-
ened the precision optimizer, but a smaller M may cause
TPR to drop too significantly. We show the effect of
M on the lower bound of pi1000 for Pa-CUMUL and the
Bi-XCor distance in Figure 5. Peak precision occurred
at M = 0.925. It makes sense that M > 1 would be im-
precise: this was the point after which the PO would not
reject classification even if the distance to its assumed
class was greater than expected. There was almost no
change in precision beyond M = 2 (when the PO almost
never rejected a classification). The figure also shows
the somewhat undesirable result that pi1000 is predicate
on choosing a correct M.
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Figure 5: Lower bound of pi1000 for Pa-CUMULwith too-
far PO, using the Bi-XCor distance on 100x100+10000
elements while varying M. The PO rejected any assumed
class for which the testing element had a distance that
was at least M times the expected distance to that class.
For the too-close PO, unlike the too-far PO, it was
not always the case that the Bi-XCor distance served
best to optimize precision. We show the best distance to
use in each column as well. The performance of most
attacks was similarly improved under the too-close PO
compared to the too-far PO. Ha-kFPwas able to achieve
a large increase in precision in the pi1000 case.
For Ca-OSAD, the optimal M value to use was 2;
for all others, it was 1. M = 1 means that the PO re-
jected the classification of any element that had a smaller
distance to a class that was not the classifier’s assumed
class. This is similar (though not identical) to an ensem-
ble scheme where we ask two classifiers to classify each
testing element, and rejected any classification where the
outputs were different. The good performance of the
above scheme suggests that ensemble learning may po-
tentially lead to better-optimized classifiers.
3.4 Ensemble PO
In ensemble learning, multiple classifiers simultaneously
classify the same testing element, and we decide the final
class based on an aggregate of each classifier’s individ-
ual classification. In adapting ensemble learning tech-
niques for OWF, we hypothesized that disagreements be-
tween different classifiers could show a lack of confi-
dence. Therefore, we should reject classification when
different classifiers output different classifications.
We first evaluate a simple bagging scheme for OWF.
We trained all classifiers except Ca-OSAD (as it could
not be trained on the full data set) separately on the same
training set using 10-fold classification. Then, we take
a subset of the classifiers and, for each testing element,
we ask each of them to determine the assumed class.
We rejected classification whenever there was no unani-
mous decision among all classifiers in the chosen subset
of classifiers. Therefore, the more classifiers there are,
the more conservative our classifications become.
We show the results for all 31 possible subsets of 5
classifiers in Table 7. We only show the minimum pi1000
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Figure 6: Lower bound of pi1000 for the match-based en-
semble PO when varying Mensemble, the minimum sum
match score, below which we would reject classification.
With Mensemble > 3.5, RT P < 0.2 and thus we discarded
these results.
(Wilson method) due to space. The black marker indi-
cates which algorithms are used. Filled black rows rep-
resent that the algorithm forms part of the subset for that
result. From top to bottom, they represent Bi-XCor,
Pa-SVM, Wa-kNN, Ha-kFP, and Pa-CUMUL. Row i
contains results for the use of i classifiers in ensemble.
For example, the second result in the third row repre-
sents the use of Bi-XCor, Pa-SVM and Ha-kFP. All
results here exceed a recall of 0.2.
From Table 7, we see that the optimal precision is
achieved when all five classifiers are used for pi1000 ≥
0.718. We observed no false positives in this case, i.e.
no element tricked all five classifiers into thinking it
belonged to the same sensitive page. The best single
classifier was Ha-kFP; the best two-classifier ensem-
ble was to add Wa-kNN; the best three-classifier ensem-
ble was to add Pa-SVM; and the best four-classifier en-
semble was to add Pa-CUMUL. Any ensemble that in-
cluded Ha-kFP was especially precise; for example, the
worst four-classifier ensemble was the one that did not
include Ha-kFP. Using more classifiers made classifi-
cation more conservative and gave better precision.
We also tested a scheme where all classifiers are used:
we first determine a combined assumed class by asking
each classifier individually what their assumed class is,
and choosing the most popular class. (Ties are broken
by more precise classifiers based on Table 4.) Then, if
the sum match score of all classifiers for that class is
less than some parameter Mensemble, we reject classifi-
cation. We show the minimum pi1000 (Wilson method)
results of this scheme in Figure 6. Unfortunately, though
this scheme seems more sophisticated than the above,
its pi1000 did not reach the high levels as the trivial all-
classifiers ensemble PO above; the peak was pi1000 ≥
0.406. Results are somewhat sensitive to a correct choice
of Mensemble, as precision quadruples from Mensemble =
3 and Mensemble = 3.5. Beyond Mensemble = 3.5, re-
call dropped below 0.2, so we only accepted results for
Mensemble ≤ 3.5.
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Table 7: Lower bound for pi1000 when a subset of the five WF attacks are used in ensemble PO. The marker besides
each result indicates which of the five WF attacks are used (black bar = used, white bar = not used). From top to
bottom, the bars represent Bi-XCor, Pa-SVM, Wa-kNN, Ha-kFP, and Pa-CUMUL in order.
.007 .004 .005 .013 .005
.039 .032 .059 .038 .065 .173 .056 .225 .049 .131
.228 .447 .205 .373 .158 .376 .543 .200 .387 .438
.656 .362 .590 .590 .705
.718
The above scheme implicitly assigns equal weights to
each classifier’s vote (except for the tie-breaking rou-
tine). This seems to defy our previous intuition that,
for example, Ha-kFP should be weighed more heavily.
Therefore, we attempted to multiply weights between to
each classifier’s match score before adding them together
to determine if they exceed some Mensemble. As there are
now six parameters, the search space is relatively large;
before developing a procedure to learn parameters, we
decided to exhaustively search the parameter space to see
if any parameters gave good results. (defying the ML
rule that training should not be used for testing).
We searched randomly for weights between 0 and 1
so that the sum weight is equal to 1, and we searched
for 24 hours to find 40,000 possible combinations of
weights. The best result we found assigned weights
〈0.028,0.342,0.005,0.249,0.376〉 to the five algorithms
with M = 0.9 to achieve pi1000 ≥ 0.663. As this is less
promising than the simpler ensemble scheme shown in
Table 7, where we had achieved pi1000 ≥ .718, we did not
test a parameter learning algorithm, and we do not rec-
ommend using this parameter-sensitive algorithm.
4 Uses for a precise WF attack
4.1 Selection
We consider a scenario where the attacker knows that a
single sensitive web page was accessed at some point,
and wants to know who did so. With auxiliary knowl-
edge (for example, when the sensitive access took place),
the attacker has narrowed it down to S particular candi-
date accesses: one is sensitive and all the others are non-
sensitive. For example, such an attacker could be some-
one who wants to track who leaked a particular sensitive
document on Tor, in which case he would look for an
access to the leaking website, and he would be able to
narrow down to a number of candidates based on when
the leak took place.
To test if a precise WF attack would be useful in this
scenario, we set up an experiment to compare the same
classifier with PO and without PO. Randomly, we choose
one out of the sensitive web pages and access it once;
then, we make S−1 accesses to non-sensitive web pages.
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Figure 7: Success rate of identifying a sensitive access
out of S possible candidates for Ha-kFP with and with-
out the confidence-based PO.
These accesses were taken randomly from the same data
set for previous experiments. The classifier with PO se-
lects the access with the highest match score as the sen-
sitive web page access. The classifier without PO tries to
classify all elements; if multiple accesses are classified
to the sensitive web page, the classifier chooses one ran-
domly. We repeat the above for 10,000 trials for each S
and take the mean of the success rate.
We compare Ha-kFP with and without confidence-
based PO in Figure 7. When there are 100 candidates,
Ha-kFP with PO has a 80% chance of identifying the
correct page access, while Ha-kFP without PO has a
63% chance. The success rate of Ha-kFP without PO
comes mostly from its TPR; while Ha-kFP with PO has
a lower TPR, its greater success in distinguishing the sen-
sitive site comes from its use of the match score. For both
algorithms, the decay in success rate is slow when S in-
creases — the random guess success rate would be 1/S.
4.2 Identifying a sensitive client
We want to know if the attacker could determine, after
some period of observing the client, whether or not the
client has a habit of visiting a particular sensitive page.
This scenario simulates an attacker who wants to identify
the client’s online behavior. For example, the attacker
may want to figure out the client’s political affiliation,
romantic status, or other demographics by deciding if the
client visits certain pages frequently.
Let us define a sensitive client as one who visits a sen-
sitive page at a rate of b, and a non-sensitive client as
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Figure 8: Success rate of identifying a sensitive client for
Ha-kFP with and without confidence-based PO, while
varying b, the rate of sensitive page visits.
one who does not visit that sensitive page. The attacker’s
goal is to distinguish sensitive clients and non-sensitive
clients for some b. To do so, the attacker observes each
client for N page accesses, performs some WF classifica-
tion on their accesses, and gets some number x of sensi-
tive page accesses. The attacker decides that the client is
a sensitive client if x>Midenti f y. Midenti f y is a parameter
that controls the trade-off between identifying sensitive
clients correctly and mistaking non-sensitive clients as
sensitive clients.
We compare Ha-kFP with and without confidence-
based PO in Figure 8. We vary the base rate between
0.001 and 0.02 and model an attacker who has observed
1000 page accesses. Therefore, in the toughest b= 0.001
case, the client has only visited the sensitive page once.
We set Midenti f y so that the rate of mis-identifying non-
sensitive clients as sensitive clients was about 1% for
both algorithms. (This was Midenti f y = 0 for Ha-kFP
with PO and Midenti f y = 8 for Ha-kFP without PO). We
can see that the confidence-based PO is much more suc-
cessful at identifying sensitive clients when b is low, with
a 70% chance of correct identification at b = 0.002, up
to 99% at b = 0.014.
It is easier to identify sensitive clients if they are mon-
itored for a longer period of time. If the attacker ob-
served 2000 page accesses, he would have a 86% chance
of identifying a client that visits a sensitive page at a base
rate of 0.002. This is a disadvantage of Tor’s long-term
guard policy; currently, Tor clients access a pool of three
guards, which last between 30 to 60 days [8], and it has
been proposed that they should last for 9 months [6]. Tor
guards are potential WF attackers. For this specific sce-
nario, it would perhaps be better for privacy if Tor guards
had a small portion of every client’s traffic, rather than
the full picture of a small number of clients’ traffic.
4.3 Attacking Defenses
A number of defenses against WF have been proposed
for anonymity technologies like Tor. Much like for WF
attacks, these defenses are almost always evaluated with
recall: a good defense would be judged by its ability to
decrease the recall of all classifiers. We wanted to know
the precision of our optimized attacks on those defenses
and whether or not their precision could be significantly
deterred by defenses.
We evaluated three WF defenses: Random Padding set
to produce 50% bandwidth and time overhead by adding
random packets, Tamaraw by Cai et al. [2], and Adap-
tive Padding by Juarez et al. [13]. Bandwidth overhead
is equal to the percentage of extra packets added by the
defense, and time overhead is equal to the percentage of
extra time required to load each web page.
We present the results in Table 8. For these results
only, we lower the minimum recall rate requirement from
0.2 to 0.02, because we chose settings for which no at-
tack can achieve a higher recall than 0.06 for Tama-
raw. For Adaptive Padding, we could only test a smaller
100x50+5000 data set because it is very slow in com-
putation; the full experiment would have taken a month.
We can see that Adaptive Padding is better in every met-
ric compared to Random Padding, though pi10 can be as
high as 0.25 for an attacker. Even without any PO, at-
tacking Adaptive Padding was relatively easy compared
to Tamaraw. However, Tamaraw suffers a much higher
time overhead; while it is possible to perform a trade-
off between bandwidth and time overhead [2], Tamaraw
cannot achieve overhead values close to those of Adap-
tive Padding. In addition, a large jump in precision is
possible in Tamaraw with confidence-based PO. Unlike
Adaptive Padding, Tamaraw has a guaranteed maximum
TPR for any WF attack (depending on the parameters),
but such a guaranteed maximum TPR does not lead to a
guaranteed minimum precision.
We did not evaluate any “targeted defenses”: a tar-
geted defense allows the client to choose which page to
mimic while accessing specific pages. While targeted
defenses give clients the advantage of creating a specific
cover story, rather than a series of randomly perturbed
packet sequences, currently there is no known mecha-
nism to automatically choose correct targets to mimic.
Wrongly chosen targets could significantly impede the
ability of the defense to lower precision, so we cannot
evaluate them fairly. These defenses include Glove [20],
Walkie-Talkie [31], and Decoy pages [22].
5 Discussion
5.1 Does Website Fingerprinting scale?
The size of our open world (50,000 pages) is unprece-
dented in WF literature, and we have shown that opti-
mized classifiers can be highly precise in our large open
world. Yet, the reader may argue that our experimen-
tal open world is tiny compared to the actual open world
(with over a billion pages). Can these results be extended
to the actual open world?
11
Table 8: Best 10-precision (pi10) with confidence-based PO on Wa-kNN against three defenses: Random Padding,
Tamaraw and Adaptive Padding.
Name Original With PO OverheadTPR pi10 TPR pi10 Bandwidth Time
Random Padding .413± .004 .093± .002 .021± .001 .446± .076 50% 50%
Tamaraw [2] .053± .002 .0065± .0002 .022± .001 .129± .001 58% 162%
Adaptive Padding [13] .27± .01 .076± .006 .029± .001 .25± .11 32% 0%
So long as the experimental procedure is correct, the
effectiveness of a system does not have to be evaluated
on all potential inputs. The essential procedure in a cor-
rect open-world experiment is that the classifier should
never be tested on the same non-sensitive pages it has
trained on. As long as we follow this rule, the real
open world size does not matter, as the attacker is (pes-
simistically) assumed to have no knowledge about any
non-monitored pages in the open world testing set.
To achieve this experimentally, we visited each non-
sensitive page only once, and split the training and test-
ing set (generally using 10-fold cross validation, though
the training set was smaller for some attacks). We also
filtered out pages with similar domain names so that they
would not both appear in our non-monitored set. Since
the classifier has no knowledge whatsoever of the non-
sensitive pages in the testing set, its decision that a test-
ing element should be classified as non-sensitive is not
based on any specific knowledge about the page it came
from. In other words, the actual open world — and its
larger size — has no impact on the classifier’s success.
The above rule leads to a conservative measure of a
WF attack’s success (recall and precision). A client can
visit one of three pages: a sensitive page, a non-sensitive
page that the attacker did not train on, and a non-sensitive
page that he did train on. The third case is easier than
the second case, but we do not allow it to happen in our
experiments; it may happen in a realistic scenario when
the attacker trains on a large open world.
As a comparison, we observe that while there may
be billions of humans, a DNA recognition or fingerprint
recognition classifier can still be considered successful
without evaluating the classifier on the majority of hu-
mans. For the same reason, it is important to evaluate the
classifier based on precision for low base-rate scenarios.
5.2 Is Website Fingerprinting realistic?
Generally, WF works make several assumptions to
present results. These assumptions include the use of
a cold cache, freshness of the training set and the lack
of noise packets unrelated to the page that could impede
classification. Several authors [12, 30] have noted that
violating these assumptions would cause recall rate to
drop. We note that assuming the use of a cold cache is
reasonable for Tor (as it does not keep cache in disk),
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Figure 9: Lower bound for pi1000 by the Wilson method
when both WPR and FPR are set to 0, and TPR is varied.
NN = 50000 indicates the use of 50,000 non-sensitive
pages, as is the case in our experiments; NN = 100000
represents what would happen if we had used 100,000
non-sensitive pages instead.
and Wang et al. [30] have shown that the training set
can be kept sufficiently fresh for classification. Wang et
al. also showed that classification is only impeded when
the bandwidth rate of noise is very high, possibly from a
video in a separate tab.
Whether or not the above problems are solved, WF
attacks must certainly have high precision to succeed in
the realistic open world, which this work focuses on.
5.3 The way forward for r-precision
The reader may have noticed that some of our POs can
give classifiers a very low false positive rate (even zero),
but pi1000 does not exceed 0.8 using the Wilson method in
our experiments. Even when there are no false positives
(in which case pi1000 should be 1), the Wilson method
correctly acknowledges that it is not likely that a separate
data set would also have no false positives, and does not
output pi1000 = 1.
To determine how pi1000 can be improved further, in
Figure 9, we show the lower bound for pi1000 by varying
TPR and setting both WPR and FPR to 0. We do this
for two cases, one matching our experimental scenario
with 50,000 non-sensitive pages, and one for a different
scenario with 100,000 non-sensitive pages.
We see that it is possible to improve pi1000 substan-
tially with higher TPR. If we had achieved a TPR of 0.4,
WPR of 0 and FPR of 0 in our experiments, then we
would have pi1000 ≥ 0.82. A “perfect” result where TPR
is 1 would have pi1000 ≥ 0.93, showing the conservative
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nature of the Wilson method. Alternatively, it is possible
to improve pi1000 by performing an experiment with more
non-sensitive pages. If we had achieved the same TPR of
0.2 on a larger data set with 100,000 non-sensitive pages,
we would have pi1000 ≥ 0.81. This shows the intuitively
correct notion that increasing the experiment size should
improve the results of a conservative estimate.
6 Related Work
Traffic analysis attacks are a threat to web browsing pri-
vacy. Cheng et al. [5], Sun et al. [25], Hintz et al. [11],
and Bissias et al. [1] were some of the first to show suc-
cessful classifiers to determine which page someone is
visiting based on traffic patterns. Later works referred to
this traffic analysis problem as website fingerprinting.
The original paper on Tor considered traffic analysis
to be a serious threat [7], though no attack had been suc-
cessful on Tor at that time as it equalized cell sizes. In
particular, Herrmann et al. [10] showed that their attack,
as well as Liberatore and Levine’s attack [15], did not
succeed against Tor; the authors were able to beat SSH
and some VPNs. Lu et al. [16], Panchenko et al. [22]
and Cai et al. [3] were some of the first to show success
against Tor. Attack accuracy was improved and compu-
tational time was decreased by Wang et al. [28], Hayes et
al. [9] and another work by Panchenko et al. [21]. These
works also began to note the significance of the open
world and conduct experiments on them.
Some previous WF works have discussed the base rate
fallacy, though no explicit attempt has been made to re-
solve it. Panchenko et al. [21] discussed issues with pre-
cision, though their attack was not precise (as seen in our
results as well), and they found that WF attacks generally
would fail in the large open world if they are not precise.
This important point underlines our paper’s motivation.
Wang et al. [28] noted that an increase in k for their k-
NN classifier decreased both TPR and FPR; though they
did not evaluate precision, an increase in k in their algo-
rithm can be considered an implicit attempt to optimize
precision for a WF attack.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
This work solves the open problem of open-world web-
site fingerprinting (OWF). We argue that precision is
more important than recall for OWF, which suggests
that previous classifiers were not correctly designed for
OWF. To resolve this issue, we formulate r-precision
(pir), which is defined as the percentage of sensitive clas-
sifications that are correct if the client visits r times as
many non-sensitive pages as sensitive pages.
We present three classes of POs to improve the preci-
sion of WF classifiers. Our confidence-based POs (based
on a match score) ask classifiers to output the degree of
confidence they have in their classifications, and we re-
ject classifications that are not confident enough. When
applied to Ha-kFP, this produced pi1000 ≥ 0.78. Our
distance-based POs reject classifications of testing ele-
ments that are too far from the assumed class. This pro-
duced pi1000 ≥ 0.61 with a distance based on Pa-SVM
when applied to Ha-kFP. Our ensemble-based POs re-
ject elements for which a chosen set of classifiers did
not unanimously agree on the assigned class. When
all five classifiers are used in ensemble, this produced
pi1000 ≥ 0.72. Without POs, the best classifier only had a
precision of pi1000 = 0.014.
Our approach has a major advantage of being adapt-
able to any classifier designed for the closed world, al-
lowing us to evaluate their effects on the breadth of pre-
viously proposed classifiers for the WF problem. Our
high precision is the result of leveraging classifiers that
are already well-built for the closed-world WF problem.
However, this also poses a limitation: the classifier itself
is not designed with precision in mind. A classifier de-
signed from the start to optimize precision could perform
better than our POs.
Previous authors have shown that a number of prob-
lems in realistic scenarios would lower recall, such as
noisy packet sequences, poor training sets and multi-
tab browsing; solutions have been proposed in previous
works. We do not know how these realistic problems and
solutions would affect precision. We believe that a final
way to demonstrate the practicality of OWF would be
to create a private Tor guard that performed website fin-
gerprinting on consenting Tor clients, telling them which
sensitive web pages they visited and asking them if it is
correct. Our optimized classifiers are up to the task.
On the flip side, defenses should also be designed to
minimize the attacker’s precision. One approach to de-
signing defenses is to create “anonymity sets” of web
pages that look the same to the attacker after padding.
This approach gives guarantees on the maximum recall
of any attacker; they may be extended to guarantee max-
imum precision when base rates are considered during
design.
Our data and code can be found at:
https://github.com/OpenWF/openwf.git
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Appendix
Here we describe each of the six previously published
attacks we tested with our POs. The attacks are Bi-
XCor [1], Pa-SVM [22], Ca-OSAD [3], Wa-kNN [28],
Ha-kFP [9] and Pa-CUMUL [21]. We describe how each
classifier represents packet sequences P as R(P), the dis-
tance d(P,P′) between two packet sequences P and P′,
the training and the testing procedures. We describe the
testing procedure by specifying match (as explained in
Section 3.2); each classifier assigns the element to the
class that scores the highest with match.
We denote packet sequences as P = 〈p1, p2, . . . , pn〉,
where pi = (ti, `i), ti is the interpacket time between pi−1
and pi, and `i is the byte length of packet pi, with positive
packet lengths representing outgoing packets from the
client and negative packet lengths representing incoming
packets to the client. With Tor cells, `i ∈ {−1,1} as all
cells have the same size. P represents the WF attacker’s
information, and he attempts to deduce which web page
it came from.
Bi-XCor
Representation. We split R(P) = (Rt(P),R`(P)), where:
Rt(P) = 〈t1, t2, . . . , tn〉
R`(P) = 〈`1, `2, . . . , `n〉
Distance. Consider two lists a and b with mean a¯, b¯
and standard deviation σa, σb respectively. We define
the cross-correlation function X(a,b) between them:
X(a,b) =
∑min(|a|,|b|)i=1 (ai− a¯)(bi− b¯)
min(|a|, |b|) ·σa ·σb
We have:
d(P,P′) = 2−X(Rt(P),Rt(P′))−X(R`(P),R`(P′))
Training. We represent each class C as R(C) =
(Rt(C),R`(C)), where the i-th element of Rt(C) is the
mean of all ti for training packet sequences from class C,
and similarly for R`(C).
Testing.
match(P,C) = d(R(P),R(C))
Pa-SVM
Representation. We extract a number of features from
each packet sequence related to packet ordering, direc-
tions, and sizes: R(P) =< f1, f2, ..., f|F | >. To see the list
of features, refer to the original work [22] or our code.
Distance. We use the radial basis function with γ = 2−25
to compute distances between the feature representations
of packet sequences. The distance is:
d(P,P′) = 1− e−γ||R(P)−R(P′)||2
Training. We train an SVM on the above pairwise dis-
tances by finding support vectors which separate classes.
Testing. The matching function uses one-against-one
SVM classification as described in Section 3.2.
Ca-OSAD
Representation.
R(P) = {`1, `2, . . .}
Distance. We compute the pairwise distance between
packet sequences P and P′ as:
d(P,P′) = 1− e−2·OSAD(P,P′)2/min(|P|,|P′|)
In the above, OSAD(P,P′) is the Optimal String Align-
ment Distance between R(P) and R(P′).
Training. We train an SVM using the custom kernel cal-
culated from the above pairwise distances.
Testing. The matching function uses one-against-one
SVM classification as described in Section 3.2.
Wa-kNN
Representation. We extract a number of features from
each packet sequence related to packet ordering, direc-
tions, and sizes: R(P) =< f1, f2, ..., f|F | >. To see the list
of features, refer to the original work [28] or our code.
Distance. We use a weighted L1-distance between P and
P′:
d(P,P′) =
|F |
∑
i=1
wi| fi− f ′i |
Training. We learn weights wi that optimize the accu-
racy of the weighted distance.
Testing.
match(P,C) = min
P′∈C
d(P,P′)
Ha-kFP
Representation. We extract features from each packet
sequence, similar to Wa-kNN. To see the list of features,
refer to the original work [9] or our code.
Distance. Ha-kFP does not produce a distance.
Training. We train a Random Forest classifier with 1000
decision trees, where each tree draws a random sample of
the input elements with replacement, resulting in a sam-
ple of equal size to the input. Each leaf L of a decision
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tree records L(x), the number of training samples of each
class that fell in that leaf, for class x.
Testing.
If P falls in leaf L for decision tree i, we calculate
matchi(P,C) = L(C)/∑x L(x). Then
match(P,C) =
1000
∑
i=1
matchi(P,C)
Pa-CUMUL
Representation. We extract features from each packet se-
quence, based on total size, time, and 100 linear inter-
polations of aggregated packet sizes. To see the list of
features, refer to the original work [21] or our code.
Distance. We use the radial basis function with γ = 2−28
to compute distances between the feature representations
of packet sequences. The distance is:
d(P,P′) = 1− e−γ||R(P)−R(P′)||2
Training. We train an SVM on the above pairwise dis-
tances by finding support vectors which separate classes.
Testing. The matching function uses one-against-one
SVM classification as described in Section 3.2.
Distances
For our distance-based POs, we derived a distance be-
tween packet sequences P,P′ based on five previous WF
attacks: Bi-XCor, Pa-SVM, Ca-OSAD, Wa-kNN and
Pa-CUMUL. The distance is equivalent to d(P,P′) as
written above for each WF attack. Then, we derived a
distance between packet sequences P and classes C based
on the distance between packet sequences as follows. We
denote C[: N] to mean the N closest elements to P in C,
and C[N] to mean the N-th closest element to P in C.
1. d(P,C) = ∑P′∈C d(P,P′)/|C|.
2. d(P,C) = ∑P′∈C[:5] d(P,P′)/|C|.
3. d(P,C) = ∑P′∈C[:25] d(P,P′)/|C|.
4. d(P,C) = d(P,C[1]).
5. d(P,C) = d(P,C[5]).
6. d(P,C) = d(P,C[25]).
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